This paper empirically identifies social learning and neighborhood effects in schooling investments in a new technology regime. The estimates of learning-investment rule from farm household panel data at the onset of the Green Revolution in India, show that (1) agents learn about schooling returns from income realizations of their neighbors and (2) schooling distribution of the parents' generation in a community has externalities to schooling investments in children that are consistent with social learning. Simulations show that variations in schooling distributions within and across communities generate through social learning substantial variations in child enrollment rate and average household income. The results suggest that imperfect information hinders investment in human capital.
Introduction
It is increasingly recognized that technological changes affect returns to schooling in both developing and developed countries (e.g., Foster and Rosenzweig 1996; Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce 1993) . To correctly infer new returns, however, agents face an informational problem. Since schooling investment is irreversible and also requires a long gestation period, agents cannot simply go to school to learn about schooling returns.
Instead, they must use observations from others to infer these returns. When agents learn from their neighbors, neighborhood factors influence the social learning.
Thus, the neighborhood is where agents learn from their neighbors. This paper examines neighborhood effects on the social learning that determines schooling decisions. The authors use household data available from the onset of the Green Revolution in India, where in some regions the diffusion of high-yielding varieties (HYVs) affected returns to schooling. The analysis shows that the schooling distribution of the parents' generation in a neighborhood is important to social learning and household decisions regarding child schooling investments.
The empirical finding that schooling decisions are correlated among neighbors can be viewed as the evidence of neighborhood effects, peer pressure, role models, norms of behavior, and social networks. The high correlation of similar decisions among neighbors has been found in many empirical studies (Case and Katz 1990; Evans, Oates, and Schwab 1993; Strauss and Thomas 1995; Topa 1997; Conley, Flyer, and Tsiang 1999) . Moreover, within-community correlations are hypothesized to justify public subsidies for education in theoretical studies (Benabou 1996) .
1 However, the process that generates the cross-sectional correlations of decisionmaking has not been empirically identified until recently, except by Besley and Case (1994) , Foster and Rosenzweig (1995) , Munshi (2004) , and Conley and Udry (2004) 2 . This study attempts to empirically identify the process of social learning and neighborhood effects on child schooling investments in a Bayesian learning model.
The question of whether agents know of and how fast they respond to return structures poses a more extensive but fundamental question into the way we think about economic development. For example, are observed variations of human-capital accumulation simply a consequence of different return-augmenting mechanisms in perfect information, as argued in endogenous growth theories (Lucas 1988; Romer 1986 )? Or are they a consequence of local environments that affect agents' learning speed under imperfect information? Even if returns are augmented, the latter would generate substantial variations in investment. Though corresponding implications for development policy differ, it is not easy to identify these two cases through casual observations.
Empirical findings regarding the above question are inconclusive. In his extensive survey on the rate of return to schooling investments, Psacharopoulos (1994) points out higher rates of return to private schooling investments in developing countries than in developed countries, especially from primary education. Child schooling investments are likely to be suboptimal in less-developed countries, although in most studies he surveys, the sampling is not random and sometimes selective. 3 The evidence on dynamic changes in enrollment rate is rare in the literature on developing economies. Foster and Rosenzweig (1996) and Rosenzweig (1990) are exceptions. They show evidence from India that private schooling investments have increased in 10 years in regions where technical change was rapid and therefore, they argue, schooling returns 2 This paper does not incorporate networks of neighbors that determine exact routes of information flow in a community, as in Conley and Udry (2004) . It is assumed in this study that households in a village can observe all the neighbors in the village and that they give equal weight to information from all their neighbors.
3 Glewwe (1996) argues that it is important to incorporate quality adjustment in schooling investments in the empirical assessment of schooling attainment. See, also, Behrman (1999) for a recent survey of empirical evidence from broader perspectives.
were augmented. 4 Given the change in returns to schooling, however, it is not clear how precisely agents inferred the true returns immediately after returns changed and, if social learning was important, how agents learned about the returns and responded with investment behavior to altered environments.
Among empirical tests for learning externalities, a few studies have explicitly incorporated sequential updating of agents' perception. 5 In the literature, social learning was identified in the context of technology adoption in agriculture. 6 To estimate the adoption rule of HYV with learning externalities, Besley and Case (1994) uses a riskneutral Bayesian framework in which agents infer the mean profitability of HYV from their neighbors. On the other hand, Foster and Rosenzweig (1995) adopt a modified target-input Bayesian model in which agents learn the best uses of inputs with the new technology and showed that farmers are learning from both their own experiences and those of neighbors. In the target-input framework, Rosenzweig (1995) also shows that schooling hastens farmers' learning speed in HYV adoption.
While the above studies assume that reference groups for agents are geographical clusters such as villages, Conley and Udry (2004) incorporates agents' networks explicitly based on actual information flows in pineapple adoption behavior in Ghana.
They show that it is not geographical proximity but rather information networks that 4 See, also, a seminal article by Schultz (1975) for discussions on the relationships between technical change, education, and schooling returns. He argues that returns to ability to deal with disequilibria increase at the time of technical changes. Although Foster and Rosenzweig (1996) does not specify the time period in which returns to schooling remain augmented due to a technical change, the advantage of being educated may cease once knowledge of new technologies diffuses completely. 5 Another strand of study is the econometric literature of reflection problems (e.g., Manski 1993a Manski , 1993b Case and Katz 1990 ). This class of study focuses on a static relationship of agents' perception and decisionmaking, ignoring possible dynamic adjustments of perception (i.e., learning). Once a reference group is identified using researchers' prior knowledge, the dynamic formation of agents' perception is factored out from the analysis. Under the assumption of stationarity, researchers can estimate the conditional distribution function of schooling returns from a large sample of income realizations, which under rational expectations enables them to assess agents' schooling decision rule. 6 See Besley and Case (1993) for a summary of possible modeling strategies to analyze the technology diffusion process. There seem to be two estimable structural modeling strategies: the updating of mean priors under risk neutrality and the target-input model under quadratic loss function. Besley and Case focus on the former.
significantly enhance social learning. 7 The importance of reference-group identification is emphasized by Manski (1993a) in his seminal work. Munshi's (2004) study is related to this paper in his attempt to identify the role of unobserved heterogeneity in determining the efficiency of social learning in the context of farmers' HYV adoption in rice and wheat productions. His results show that farmers may learn less from others when production is more sensitive to farm-specific idiosyncratic factors, and that unobserved heterogeneity is more important.
One conclusion of this paper is that heterogeneity helps agents learn. While
Munshi examines heterogeneity that is unobservable (and idiosyncratic) to agents, this paper examines heterogeneity that is observable. In an analogous way, error terms (i.e., unobserved heterogeneity) in econometric estimation deter precise parameter estimates, while the variations in explanatory variables (i.e., observed heterogeneity) help estimate parameters precisely. The details will be described in Section 2.
In this paper, I assume that households are attentive to the expected returns to schooling, i.e., that agents are risk neutral. An alternative modeling strategy would be to use a target-input framework, as in Foster and Rosenzweig (1995) . The target-input framework is suitable for identifying learning externalities if the externalities affect input allocation decisions and therefore the actual profitability of investment in the context of HYV adoption. However, the informational spillovers from neighbors should only influence agents' perceptions on their future income gains-returns-in the context of schooling investments in children. The income gain from advancing to a higher level of education will be realized only in the future, after agents complete the education. The returns will be realized when agents accumulate their labor-market experience. Hence, learning about schooling returns does not lead to changes in profitability or income at the time the decision is made. In the framework of this paper, I therefore model social 7 Conley and Udry (2004) uses spatial standard errors that incorporate the spatial dependence of error terms. In our data, residential locations of households are only identified by villages and inter-household geographical proximity is not known. Villages are geographically distant from each other in our data. Moreover, the data contain no measures of the density of actual information networks.
learning and investment behavior such that learning externalities change agents' perceptions of future income gain and agents change their schooling decisions in response to changes in their perceptions, but informational spillover is neutral to current incomes that directly influence the current welfare of agents.
The following two points need careful attention. First, in any kind of test for externalities, it is important to exclude the possibility that observed cross-agent correlations of schooling decisions are spurious, i.e., driven by common unobservable factors. For example, variations in schooling investment can be attributed to unobserved heterogeneous local endowments and preference for education. Since unobserved factors are often strongly correlated with observable factors, we can easily infer a spurious correlation between observables and schooling investments. Any empirical analysis must meet the challenge of identifying learning externalities against common unobservables.
Second, both social learning and learning-by-doing lead to similar observable implications. The observation that schooling investments are positively correlated with an income gap between the educated and the uneducated does not necessarily imply social learning. Suppose that to find the best manager among household members, the household experiments by assigning each member in turn to the manager. In villages where schooling returns are increased, households eventually discover that the best farm manager is the most educated member. In this scenario, information from neighbors plays no role. To distinguish social learning from this within-family learning-by-doing, it is therefore imperative to examine not only the relationship between schooling return signals and schooling investments, but also the process by which neighborhood factors affect social learning, with a theoretical framework to interpret empirical findings.
In the next section, a theoretical framework is formulated to provide a basis for the empirical analysis. 1968-69, 1969-70, and 1970-71 , which correspond to the onset of the Green
Revolution, when at least in some districts, farmers experienced changes in schooling returns (see Rosenzweig 1990 ).
Section 5 summarizes empirical results. First, schooling investment is positively correlated with the income difference between educated and uneducated households. The finding is consistent with social learning. Second, schooling distribution of the parents' generation in a village influences the response of school enrollment to schooling return signals-that is, agents' learning speed-in a manner consistent with theoretical predictions on social learning. Local schooling distribution of the parents' generation has intergenerational externalities to schooling investments in children.
In Section 6, I simulate paths of enrollment rate and average household income, based on the estimated learning-schooling investment rule. Simulations show that school enrollment rate would increase by about 3 percentage points in five years if the proportion of educated households in a village increases from 0 to 0.53. Since educated households have, on average, a higher income than uneducated households, a disparity of average household income would emerge over the five years. Thus, the initial distribution of schooling-which differs across communities-determines the evolution of income inequality over space. The analysis also has some aggregate implications:
reallocating agents across communities can improve the aggregate response of schooling investments to a change in returns. This economy-wide implication is also quantified based on the estimated parameters. The final section summarizes the findings of this paper and discusses further implications.
Model
In this section, I formulate a two-stage model and derive empirical implications.
In the first stage, agents observe income realizations of their parents and neighbors and make schooling choices. When agents decide schooling investments, they face subjective uncertainty in the inference on returns to schooling. 8 Uncertainty is resolved in the second stage.
The Environment
Time is discrete and refers to year ( 1 t T = ,..., < +∞ ). In each community, children who are randomly born decide their schooling level at an exogenously given age, 
In a seminal article, Schultz (1961) argues the importance of assessing uncertainty on the future outcome of education in private schooling decisions. 9 Since the timing of the decision is fixed, strategic interactions of investment decisions are assumed out. Whether parents or children themselves make schooling decisions is also trivial, if parents cannot change their schooling levels. 10 I may incorporate sequential or multiple-choice decisionmaking. However, since the current setting suffices to provide basic intuitions, I will focus on this binary-choice model.
is an idiosyncratic shock to j, and Assume that parents and children can observe current income realizations in equation (1) and schooling distributions { }
for all agents i in their community.
Their problem is to infer schooling returns from
for all i. We omit τ until the discussion on empirical strategy.
Risk-neutral children choose h H at t if the expected value of net returns for
where j t Ω is information set for agent j at t, c is the cost of advancing schooling investment to a higher level (e.g., transportation cost, increasing as distance to school increases), b j is credit borrowed for financing schooling investments, r j is interest rate for household j, and w c is child wage (i.e., opportunity cost). Assume that the interest rate is increasing and convex in the amount borrowed and decreases in landholding size, such 11 Alternatively (Yamauchi K., 1998) , ability heterogeneity in income process can be incorporated as follows: ability is defined as the probability that a task is done successfully, q j = prob(a j,t = 1), where a j,t takes the value of 1 if the task is done successfully. Income process is written as
In this setting, complementarity of ability and schooling exists. Ability defines a likelihood that schooling matters in income determination. Agents learn about q j and Δθ from income realizations of parents and neighbors. In this framework, however, econometricians face a rather involved inference problem due to the unobservability of a j,t . 12 Returns to schooling may be positive only temporarily and converge to zero as time passes after a structural change. However, if there is a strictly positive probability for a structural change, the expected returns to schooling can be positive. 
satisfies the first order condition:
Therefore, the condition for schooling investment is 
Social Learning
Bayesian learning gives a theoretical foundation for the following empirical analysis. In the empirical setting of this paper, social learning is defined as learning about the unknown schooling-return gap θ H -θ L from income realizations in the neighborhood. Assume that the prior mean of the return gap follows
Under the assumption that t v and j t ξ , are also normally distributed, the posterior mean on the return is written as
where schooling return signal is
Prior mean is updated with additional information from the realized average incomes among educated and uneducated households. Note that signals are unbiased, i.e.,
The learning weight (4) is written as
where s(x) is noise variance, i.e.,
In the case that
, sampling strategy is sensitive to the distribution of landholding size in a finite population and to the variances of aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks. There is a trade-off between additional value from new information and an increase in noise. If there are variations in landholding size within a group, agents need to choose a subset of agents from each group to minimize the variance of noise in signals. To clarify this point, we consider two extreme situations. In the case that σ > , it is the optimal strategy to sample observations from the two groups of neighbors such that
is as close to zero as possible. Note that both N H and N L are endogenous here.
In this way, the adverse effect of aggregate risks would be minimized. Second, in the case that where n is the proportion of educated households, N is the total number of households, a is the ratio of idiosyncratic shock variances of the educated to the uneducated ( , also converges to zero, which implies learning speed is high in the initial periods but decreasing over time. However, learning speed depends on community characteristics x.
By equations (3), (4), (5), and (6), (3) is obtained as a lag polynomial of observed return signals.
where ( ) (8) is In this case, we expect that school enrollment increases over time but at a diminishing rate.
Learning weight W t defines the adjustment speed of agents' perceptions on schooling returns. In the empirical analysis of this study, the characterization of learning speed also provides neighborhood effects that arise from social learning. Thus, the effect of schooling return signals on schooling investments depends on neighborhood characteristics and therefore can differ across communities. The following proposition summarizes neighborhood effects.
Proposition 1. Learning Speed: Identification of Neighborhood Effects-Social Learning
(i) The speed of adjustment in agents' perception on schooling return differential, defined as W t , is decreasing and convex in income volatility.
(ii) The adjustment speed is concave in the proportion of the educated in community population, and there exists the maximum at
Moreover, n * is increasing in a, ratio of idiosyncratic shock variances for the uneducated to the educated.
Proof.
(i): Directly follows from the first and second derivatives of equation (6) with respect to 2 ( ) L ξ σ and to N.
(ii): n enters only in ( )
. By differentiating W t with respect to n,
where Den t denotes ( )
Here the effects of (i) income risks and (ii) schooling distribution of the parents' generation are highlighted. These neighborhood factors characterize learning speed, i.e., responsiveness of agents' perceptions to signals. Implications are quite intuitive in terms of simple regression problem.
First, income uncertainty magnifies noise in observations, which hinders agents'
learning. In a risky and therefore less informative environment, it is difficult for agents to decipher the true return from incomes, since incomes fluctuate stochastically.
Second, there exists in each community a unique schooling distribution, the proportion of educated households, which maximizes learning speed. Heterogeneity (inequality) rather than homogeneity (equality) of schooling levels in a community facilitates social learning. Intuitively, if population is heterogeneous in observable characteristics, it is easy for agents (and researchers) to correctly decipher income difference that attribute to the difference in those observable characteristics. This point is analogous to the role of variations in explanatory variables in regression analysis, in which income level is regressed on years of schooling. The slope coefficient measures schooling returns. As the years of schooling (explanatory variable) vary in a sample, the estimate becomes more precise (and therefore more efficient).
The optimal proportion of the educated depends on income-shock heteroskedasticity between the educated and uneducated. If income shock variance is larger for educated farmers than for uneducated farmers (i.e., larger a), the income process for the educated contains more noise. In this case, n * must increase to hasten learning speed as a larger sample size from the educated offsets the adverse effect of noise in their incomes.
Specification, Identification, and Estimation
In this section, I describe the empirical strategy with focus on specification and identification issues. 16 There are two possibilities in empirical strategy. I may trace agents' learning and sequential decisionmaking. Signals for agents can be approximated as residuals from profit function, which includes information on unknown returns to schooling. This approach was attempted in Yamauchi (1998) . However, by construction, the residual-based return signals may contain unobserved factors that are potentially correlated with education, which biases the returns upward. Moreover, if parents'
education is positively correlated with child schooling, it is easy to infer a positive correlation between the residual-based return signal and child schooling.
In this paper, I can directly estimate schooling returns that agents learn about with which to identify schooling decisions. The basic strategy involves two stages. In the first stage, I identify farm profit function, including the effect of education. It is possible to check whether schooling returns had changed when HYV became available in some villages. I estimate (1) village-specific schooling returns separately for each village, and (2) the impact of HYV adoption on schooling returns, from which to construct villagespecific schooling returns. I focus on the first approach in the main analysis, and check the robustness with the second approach.
In the second stage, I estimate the learning-investment rules with the estimates of schooling return signals constructed from the first stage, incorporating theoretical predictions on neighborhood effects. Identification for social learning versus learning by doing is discussed in the end of this section. 16 In general, it is important for observers (researchers) to (1) make a distinction between what economic agents know and do not know and (2) know what researchers can identify (available from data). In general, information set available to researchers is smaller than information set for economic agents. In some events, however, it is possible to identify parameters that agents did not know, using ex post information contained in data.
Construction of Signals from Profit Function
Farmers know the pre-Green-Revolution structure of their profit function. It is assumed that, before the Green Revolution, schooling did not matter in farm profit. The profit function before t 0 is
where { } must assume that household fixed effect α j is uncorrelated with I(s j = H). Since education was determined prior to the Green Revolution, it is unlikely to be correlated with profit shocks, but it could be potentially correlated with unobserved household-level fixed components within the village. In this estimation, I include irrigation asset per unit of cropland and year fixed effects.
To check the robustness of the major findings, the estimated village-specific returns are regressed on the initial-year average HYV adopted. In this exercise, we assume Foster and Rosenzweig (1996) results that HYV availability increased the returns to schooling. 
where h j,τ is child enrollment rate for household j, μ 0 is unobserved initial prior mean, φ j is a fixed effect, and ε j,τ is measurement errors and shocks of h j,τ . We include a set of 17 Rather than estimating profit function with the interaction of HYV and schooling in differenced form using instruments, 
If farmers face borrowing constraints, there arises a positive correlation between current profit shocks (u j,t ) and the next period's stock ( 
Therefore, this correlation makes the estimates β and γ and biased downward. To consistently estimate parameters in equation (11), I use the vector of instruments Z j that satisfy the following conditions:
For this purpose, the initial capital stocks and various village characteristics are used as instruments under the assumption that, before the beginning of initial period t 0 , agents were not able to foresee the t 0 structural change and therefore could not change their capital stocks and village-level characteristics. In other words, technical changes occurred randomly and that agents did not alter their behavior and environments prior to the Green Revolution. I can construct τ is the village-average HYV adoption (per cropland). However, the lack of effective instruments specific for HYV adoption and schooling makes the estimation results inconclusive. See Foster and Rosenzweig (1996) , who innovatively used the inherited asset for this purpose. Without such an identifying instrument, I would not pursue the above approach.
control variables such as the proportion of educated households, risk variance (n,σ 2 defined specifically below), household-level demographics, and village-level factors.
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Assume that μ 0 has zero mean and a finite variance.
In our main analysis, we use standard errors of returns estimates obtained in the first stage to assess σ 2 . This reflects the agents' estimation uncertainty regarding the returns to schooling specific to each village. In the second approach, we do not use this measure but only examine the implications on the proportion of educated households.
To construct the proportion of educated households for each village, within- Return signals ^θ Δ can be correlated with community unobservables φ j , e.g., the presence of good school and qualified teachers. It is therefore necessary to eliminate φ j from the specification. In other words, I need to eliminate the possibility that fixed community factors lead to erroneously inferring social learning effects. For this purpose, a difference of equation (12) is taken between τ and 0 for estimation. In the above method, it is important to understand that returns signals used in the estimation of learning equations are estimated in the village-wise profit functions.
Therefore, this estimated signal contains estimation uncertainty in the first stage (see Murphy and Topel 1985) . To cope with this problem and correct standard error estimates for the parameters of interest in the second stage, I instead take the following simulation- 
Identification: Social Learning versus Learning by Doing
Positive response of child schooling to village-specific schooling returns implies both social learning and learning by doing. Suppose that returns to schooling increase in a village. Households can delegate decisionmaking to each individual and find who can manage the best. If the educated can do better than the uneducated, each household can learn schooling returns by this experimentation, without learning from their neighbors.
Hence, in both social learning and learning by doing, we can observe positive effect of schooling returns on child schooling.
To identify social learning against learning-by-doing, I use a subsample of households in which heads have no education at all. In this group, I conjecture that children cannot learn about schooling returns from previous generations. Therefore, social-learning effect must be detected (if it exists) for this group of households.
In addition, knowing the specific roles that neighborhood factors play are also useful to identify the characteristics of social learning. In household-level learning-bydoing, neighborhood factors do not matter in the response of school enrollment to return signals.
Data
Data come from the National Council of Applied Economic Research (NCAER), Additional Rural Incomes Survey (ARIS), India, which covers a nationally representative sample of rural households over three crop years: 1968-69, 1969-70, and 1970-71. A unique feature of the data is that India during this period was experiencing the onset of the Green Revolution. Farm households in some regions, therefore, are in substantial disequilibrium where returns to schooling had changed in response to the availability of imported new HYVs for wheat and rice (Rosenzweig 1990) . Also, regional variations in the adoption rates of HYV seeds (see Rosenzweig 1990, and also Munshi 2004) ARIS data contain information on production and household characteristics. The summary statistics of the major variables I used for the estimation of profit function and human-capital investment rule are summarized in Table 1 .
To construct signals on schooling returns, as discussed in the previous section, I
first estimate farm profit function using information on crop profit and input variables. In ARIS, the observations with gross cropland normalized as 1 (which corresponds to zero acres used for farming) are excluded from estimation, because these observations produce clear outliers in farm profit per unit of land. Notes: The numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. Enrollment rate is that of children aged 5 to 14. Some observations that show enrollment rate larger than 1 are excluded. Education is the indicator that takes the value of 1 if the highest level of education attained among household members is more than primary school and zero otherwise. For the construction of village characteristics, see Section 3.
The information on child school enrollment was collected in the first and third rounds, 1968-69 and 1970-71. In estimation, child school enrollment rates for children aged 5-14 is used as a measure of child schooling. In ARIS, children are grouped in three age-sex categories: boys aged 10-14, girls aged 10-14, and children aged 5-9. For each group, the number of enrolled children is recorded in the data. I can therefore compute household-wise average enrollment rates and group-specific enrollment rates. 19 Primary schools in India educate children aged 6-14. Since I use the indicator for schooling beyond primary level, this indicator does not pertain to children in primary school.
Households with no children and inconsistent figures are dropped in preliminary stages.
Through this process, sample size becomes 2,020 for the third round and 2,018 for the first round. Merging the third and first rounds, sample size becomes 1,803. 20 To take advantage of this panel structure, a difference of household-specific child enrollment rate is taken between the first and third rounds.
Empirical Results

Schooling Returns
As schooling variable in ARIS is categorical, I use a binary measure 1(k j = H), which takes the value of 1 if the highest schooling in a household is above primary and zero otherwise. By construction, it is impossible to estimate the village-specific returns for villages where all sample households are either educated or uneducated. The number of villages to be used in the analysis is 202. As discussed, I estimate the profit function (per unit of cropland) with the highest schooling indicator, irrigation asset (per unit of cropland), and year fixed effects for each village.
19 In a preliminary analysis in which boys aged 10-14, girls aged 10-14, and children aged 5-9 are treated separately in enrollment rate, boys' enrollment rate is found to be more responsive to return-differential signals than girls' enrollment rate. The role of boys, especially firstborn, might be important in agricultural production, because land is usually inherited by the firstborn son. However, the framework of this paper is not appropriate for addressing gender issues in agricultural production. 20 In sample villages, a certain proportion of residents are agricultural labor households. Households could learn about return differentials from both farm and agricultural labor households. However, because technical change considered here directly affected farm productivity in the first order and the earnings for agricultural labor only in the second order (see Foster and Rosenzweig, 2001) , it is justified that the information source for schooling returns in this new technology regime is a group of farm households in villages. Furthermore, farm household mobility is negligible. Figure 1 shows the distribution of the estimated village-specific schooling returns.
A similar distribution is also obtained when I use a different specification of profit function with farm equipment, farm asset, and livestock. Therefore, we may assert that the distribution of schooling returns is stable in our sample villages. To know the effect of HYV availability on the estimated village-specific schooling returns, I estimate γ in Foster and Rosenzweig's (1996) result that technical change increased returns to schooling at primary education. Notes: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Standard errors are corrected to incorporate schooling returns standard errors in the first-stage village-wise estimation. All specifications include gross cropland, the numbers of boys and girls aged above 14, between 10-14, between 5-9, and below age 4, respectively, the number of babies aged less than 1, indicators for more than primary, school presence in village and veterinary health clinic, village population, modernity and electricity indexes, and income and expenditure deciles in the initial year.
Column 1 reports the benchmark estimate of the effect of schooling returns on enrollment rate, which is positive but insignificant. Column 2 includes the proportion of educated households and the variance of schooling returns (both specific to village).
Interestingly, the former has a significant and positive effect on the enrollment rate. With this effect controlled, the significance of schooling returns effect increases.
Columns 3 and 4 include the interaction terms of schooling returns and the above neighborhood characteristics. Column 3 shows that the proportion of educated households significantly increases the effect of village-specific schooling returns on the enrollment rate. This result is consistent with our major prediction. However, in column 4, the nonlinearity in the marginal effects was not supported. In contrast, the variance of schooling returns has no significant effect.
The specifications include the indicator of the highest schooling, initial cropland, the indicator of school presence in the village, and numbers of children in different age and gender groups and other village-level variables as controls. 21, 22 Note that there could be spurious correlations of village-specific unobservables (that affect schooling investments) and observable village characteristics (such as the above neighborhood factors of our interest) in the learning function. To overcome this problem, the differenced learning equation, equation (13) Column 5 checks the effect of estimated schooling returns on the change in enrollment rate without any neighborhood factors. The effect is positive and significant.
Column 6 includes the proportion of educated households and the variance of schooling returns. Interestingly, the proportion of educated households increases the change in enrollment rate (though insignificantly) and the variance significantly decreases the change in enrollment rate. The marginal effect of schooling returns remains significant.
Columns 7-8 include the interaction terms of these neighborhood factors and schooling returns. Most interestingly, it is found that as the proportion of educated households increases, the effect of schooling returns increases but diminishes and 21 Some elder siblings may have already completed higher than primary during the sample period. In this case, the restriction of our sample to those households with no member educated more than primary biases our results when this schooling decision was a result of learning. 22 A positive effect of school presence (not shown here) indicates the availability of educational institutions also enhancing schooling investments. To remove a spurious correlation between village characteristics and schooling decisions, the presence of schools must be controlled for. This correlation may have arisen from government's (public) decisionmaking in the allocation of schools to communities that have certain characteristics. Without a school dummy for control purposes, neighborhood characteristics in the learning function could be significant since those characteristics are likely correlated with the presence of schoolspublic schooling investments-that increase private schooling investments.
decreases in a concave way. This result is consistent with our theoretical prediction.
Other parameters are insignificant in this specification.
In Columns 5-8, the significant negative effect of the initial year enrollment rate is also consistent with our prediction, which implies that enrollment rate is converging across households over time.
Appendix Table 3 confirms the above results, using a measure of technical change. Column 2 shows a significant and positive effect of the proportion of educated households on the change in enrollment rate. Though the interaction with schooling returns is insignificant in column 3, the nonlinear effects are significant and consistent with our prediction in column 4.
There is a unique optimal schooling distribution of the parents' generation. Also, initial enrollment rate significantly reduces the growth of enrollment rate. Enrollment rate therefore seems to converge over time across villages. Based on the estimates in column 8 of Table 2 , I can compute the optimal proportion of educated households that maximizes learning speed as 0.5318. 23 To take this concavity seriously, the next section demonstrates some dynamic implications of this finding.
Simulations: Schooling and Income Dynamics
The parameter estimates of the learning-investment rule enable simulations of dynamic paths of school enrollment rates and average household income. There are two types of exercises. First, I simulate the effects of the schooling distribution of the parents' generation on enrollment rates and household income in a village. Second, I
simulate the effects of the cross-community schooling redistribution on the economywide averages of enrollment rate and household income. The second exercise offers macroeconomic and distributional implications of the estimates. The concavity of schooling distribution effect implies that to maximize effectiveness of social learning, a mixture of educated and uneducated households in a community is more desirable than segregation by community. If so, it is better to mix both groups in every community in order to attain the most efficient transitional dynamics of schooling and income.
These simulations involve some assumptions. First, the simulations do not incorporate changes in prior variance over the three years, and therefore the simulated enrollment rates will not converge to the upper bound. This results in the accumulation of prediction errors if enrollment rates and household incomes are simulated over long periods. To avoid such a case, simulations are restricted to a five-year period. The following simulation exercises are based on the estimates from column 8 in Table 2 .
Second, since village-wise averages of return gap signals of 1969-70 and 1970-71 are used in the estimation, half of the values of each parameter are taken for simulations.
The negative effect of the initial enrollment rate is not controlled in exercises below.
Intra-Village Schooling Distribution
This section quantifies the effects of intra-village schooling distribution on enrollment rate and household income. Figure 2 illustrates the simulated school enrollment rate at the end of the fifth year after a structural change for different values of the proportion of educated households.
It is assumed here that agents encounter the sample mean of return signals. The figure depicts a well-formed concave shape with the maximum increase in enrollment occurring at n * = 0.5318. The figure demonstrates the quantitative importance of predetermined within-village schooling distribution of the parents' generation. For example, as the proportion decreases from n * to 0, the enrollment-rate increase drops by about 2.75 percentage points. Though the schooling distribution effect is found to be significant in this exercise, the value of 4 percentage points of change could be overestimated because the convergence of enrollment rate to some upper bound is not assumed in the simulation. The educated farm households earn, on average, a higher income than the uneducated households in this sample. I compute 315.9939 × 0.4620008 e t , where 315.99390 is the average landholding size over the three years, 0.4620008 is the estimated marginal effect of schooling indicator on crop income per land with village fixed effects, and e t is the enrollment rate at time t. Under this assumption, the 4-percentage point change in enrollment rate leads to the income change of 4.01 rupees.
Gains from Inter-Village Schooling Reallocation
The empirical finding that inequality (rather than equality) of schooling in a community enhances social learning provides an interesting macroeconomic implication:
given a finite number of educated agents in an economy, intra-community schooling distributions should be similar across communities to maximize the aggregate learning speed. In this section, I experiment with three cases of cross-community schooling distributions to quantify the effect on the economy-average enrollment rate increase. The cases that I consider here are as follows: (1) Figure 3 shows increases in the economy-wide average enrollment rate in the fifth year after a change in returns. It is predicted that the stronger the concavity of learning function in n, the more divergent the three cases. At the end of the fifth year after a structural change, the average enrollment rate rises nearly by 2.75 percentage points in the degenerate case (case 1) and it rises by 1.25 percentage points in the complete segmentation case (case 3). The aggregate response of human-capital investments toward a rise in schooling returns varies by nearly 1.5 percentage points as the cross-community allocation of schooling moves from complete integration to complete segmentation.
Conclusions
This paper shows that neighborhood factors matter in schooling investments, with evidence from farm household panel data from the Green Revolution in India. In the face of the HYV availability that altered schooling returns, agents learned of the benefits of new returns to schooling from neighbors and adjusted schooling investments over time.
In this context, the empirical results clarify the importance of schooling distribution of the parents' generation within a community. Heterogeneity of schooling increases informativeness of the community when it encounters a change in schooling returns, since agents easily compare differentially educated agents. The homogeneous community with few differences in schooling makes it hard to identify the effects of schooling. This intuitive prediction was supported in the empirical analysis of this paper.
To increase learning efficiency in a society, should the educated and uneducated be integrated or segregated by communities? Our findings imply that integration of the two populations in a community is more desirable. Intuitively, given that a mixture of the two groups in a neighborhood enables the comparison between the groupsschooling returns, in this paper-all communities should be heterogeneous. This implication is against a common finding on positive sorting in residential choice behavior (e.g., Fernandez 2001) . If agents are sorted by their types, including education, in the choice of their residential areas, the population becomes more homogeneous in a community and weakens the response of schooling investments to a change in schooling returns. If social learning effects are not internalized in agents' location choice, the evidence of this paper justifies a socially desirable policy intervention. This implication should not be exclusive to education but could equally apply to issues such as social class and the division of labor.
However, the relevance of the findings in this paper depends on the frequency of structural changes. As stated in Schultz (1975) , if the benefit of education generates from situations of disequilibrium such as the Green Revolution, the augmented returns to schooling will eventually decrease as the knowledge of new technologies diffuses evenly and widely in the population. All these issues still remain unexplored and should be examined carefully in the context of developing countries. Notes: Numbers in parentheses are absolute t values. The numbers of observations left censored and right censored are 30 and 23, respectively. The sample is restricted to those villages where the mean of HYV adopted in the initial year was strictly positive and the estimated returns in the last year were less than 0.02 (to exclude outlying observations). Schooling returns are the average of returns estimates predicted by the average HYV adopted in 1969-70 and 1970-71 in each village. For details, see Sections 3 and 4. All specifications include gross cropland, the numbers of boys and girls aged above age 14, aged 10-14, aged 5-9, and below age 4, respectively, the number of babies aged less than 1, indicators for more than primary, school presence in village and veterinary health clinic, village population, modernity and electricity indexes, income, and expenditure deciles in the initial year. Does Urban Agriculture Help Prevent Malnutrition? Evidence from Kampala, Daniel Maxwell, Carol Levin,
